Past research shows that members of Congress are informed traders, i.e., that they earn abnormal returns while in office. This important research does not identify whether being elected leads to informed trading or whether informed traders are selected into office. We try to provide a partial answer to this question by looking at whether new members of Congress were informed traders prior to being elected and how their portfolio performance changes after election and appointment to different types of committees. Due to data limitations our analysis focus on the pre-congressional (i.e., election) and congressional (i.e., post-election) common stock trades made by newly elected members of Congress from 2004-2010. We find weak evidence of informed trading for the pre-Congress period, suggesting that informed traders are not being selected into office. When combined with our finding that the portfolios of members serving on powerful committees outperform the market during their second term in office, this provides additional evidence that serving on influential committees is the mechanism by which members of Congress earn abnormal returns.
Two influential studies by Ziobrowski et al. (2004 Ziobrowski et al. ( , 2011 analyzed the stock transactions that members of Congress (members) made prior to 2002, and uncovered that their portfolios earn abnormal returns. Members of Congress were not liable for insider trading on material nonpublic information during this period (Bainbridge, 2011) . In response to public criticism, Congress passed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act in 2012, which explicitly banned trading on legislative information and required mandatory online disclosure of congressional trades. Within a year, however, mandatory online disclosures were eliminated, putatively due to national security concerns (Vardi, 2013) .
The passage and the partial repeal of the STOCK Act led to further interest in Congressional stock trades. Eggers and Hainmueller (2014) found that politicians' investments in local stocks generate modest abnormal returns. Karadas (2015) Employing CRP data, we first identify all first-time members of Congress who traded common stocks during the election period and measure the information content of their transactions via transactions-based calendar-time portfolios. In the second part of our analysis, we identify new members of Congress who consistently traded stocks during their election year and two subsequent congressional terms and measure their portfolio performance. Our analysis shows that there is weak and inconsistent evidence of informed trading by members of Congress prior to their Congressional service. Furthermore, it takes two consecutive terms for members to be able to make informed trades, but this advantage is restricted only to those who serve on powerful committees as defined by the well known Grosewart method (Groseclose and Stewart III, 1998; Stewart III, 2012) . Our results imply that there are returns to joining Congress, but these returns are not equally distributed across members.
More importantly, we show that members of Congress are not informed traders in the period leading up to their elections. This is further evidence that the source of abnormal returns is either information or power related to their Congressional service.
In addition, our paper contributes to public choice theory in two ways. First, there is a large literature on the supply and demand for committee assignments (Shepsle, 1975; Munger, 1988; Grier and Munger, 1991; Coker and Crain, 1994; Groseclose and Stewart III, 1998) . By providing evidence that members of powerful committees earn abnormal returns, we provide additional insight into the demand for certain committee assignments beyond the ability to receive higher campaign contributions (Grier and Munger, 1991; Groseclose and Stewart III, 1998) . Second, Henry Manne observed over 50 years ago that the largest producer of information that could influence the stock market is the federal government (Manne, 1966) . Our results highlight the possibility that members of Congress either trade on material nonpublic information or use committee assignments to influence policy in a way that targets specific firms or sectors (Fisman, 2001; Knight, 2006) in a manner that enriches themselves (Milyo, 2014) . With the exception of Anderson et al. (1994) , we know of no public choice papers highlighting abnormal returns of politicians.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 summarizes our data on trading by members of Congress, while Section 3 describes our empirical approach. In Section 4, we present our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data
We obtain congressional common stock transactions data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CPR) for the 2004-2010 period.
1 We exploit the fact that members of Congress not only report their common stock transactions during their congressional service years but also during the years that they first run for Congress. We obtain the list of freshmen members of Congress in every congressional term from publicly-available sources. Then we determine the trades that these new members made before and after they joined the Congress. Forty of the 71 new members do not have congressional (post-election) stock transactions.
1 There have been substantial delays in the reporting of congressional stock transactions. These trades were reported via paper-based filings by members 5 to 17 months after they took place. The Center for Responsive Politics has done a valuable service in converting these paper-based records to usable data sets. Nevertheless, this entire process causes 2 to 3 years delays in making the data available to the public. Furthermore, congressional transactions data are very challenging to clean. See Karadas (2015) for the details of the data cleaning process.
Recall that our data covers stock transactions only until the end of 2010. As a result, some of these 40 members may have traded stocks at some point in their congressional career, but their trades will not show up in our sample if they were placed after 2010. 3 Empirical Methodology
Empirical Setup
Following Ziobrowski et al. (2004) , we first construct synthetic portfolios to examine the portfolio performance of new members of Congress. We set up a portfolio of buy transactions (buy portfolio) and a portfolio of sell transactions (sell portfolio) for each member in our sample using daily stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
A buy portfolio tracks the performance of the stocks that a member purchases, from the purchase date to a specified future date. Similarly, a sell portfolio tracks the performance of the stocks that a member sells from his or her portfolio. If a member buys before stock prices rise, his or her buy portfolio will perform well. On the other hand, if he or she sells before stock prices drop, the sell portfolio will perform poorly, which is translated into losses avoided by selling at the right time. Both of these cases imply the presence of informed trading.
In constructing member-level buy and sell portfolios, we weight individual transactions either equally or by transaction dollar amount. We allow a transaction to stay in the portfo-lio under six different holding periods, which are 1/4, 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12 months. Accordingly, under the 1/4-month (one-week) holding period, transactions are put into the portfolio on the day they occur, and they are discarded from the portfolio one week later. These hold- 
Risk-Adjusted Performance Measure
We are interested in measuring the performance of the buy-minus-sell portfolios constructed from the new members' transactions. If members are informed traders, we anticipate the sign of the returns on these portfolios to be positive (Odean, 1999) . However, such a sign analysis does not suffice to produce a risk-adjusted performance measure. For this purpose, we resort to the conventional performance evaluation models in finance. In particular, we use Capital Asset Pricing Model, Fama-French 3-Factor Model (Fama and French, 1993) , Carhart 4-Factor Model (Carhart, 1997) , and liquidity-added 5-Factor Model (Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003) . We obtain the data for these models from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
Below we specify the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as our baseline model:
where r p,t is the return on the new members' buy-minus-sell portfolio in month t. The dependent variable is the excess market returns rewarded over the risk-free rate. Our main interest in this model is the intercept, α (alpha), which captures the magnitude of abnormal performance (i.e., abnormal returns). The rest of the models add additional variables to the CAPM, but we are still interested in the economic and statistical significance of the alpha. To distinguish between the alphas generated from each model, we separately label them as CAP M Alpha, F F Alpha, CarhartAlpha, and 5 − F actorAlpha in our tables. The justification for estimating these four different models is that later ones are built on the earlier ones, controlling for additional factors. For example, the CAPM only controls for the market factor under the assumption that market returns alone determine the returns on a given stock. Fama-French 3-Factor Model controls for the factors that are related to the size (market capitalization) and value (book-to-market ratio) in addition to controlling for the market factor. Carhart 4-Factor Model adds a momentum factor to Model to account for the short-time price trends in stock returns. 5-Factor Model is the most comprehensive model in our analysis, employing all the variables in Carhart model and an additional factor that captures the effect of illiquidity in stock returns.
A statistically significant positive alpha implies that politicians' portfolios have aboveaverage performance (abnormal returns) and that politicians are informed traders. On the other hand, a statistically significant negative alpha implies that politicians' portfolios have below-average performance and that politicians lack value-relevant information. A statistically insignificant alpha suggests that politicians have average portfolio performance with no informational advantage or disadvantage. For example, Odean (1999) examines the portfolio performance of retail traders by constructing buy-minus-sell portfolios and show that these portfolios underperform the market with negative alphas. If politicians are similar to retail traders, the results from our analysis should be similar to those reported by Odean (1999) .
Empirical Analysis and Results

Are Members of Congress Informed Traders to Begin With?
In order to determine whether members of Congress trade on value-relevant information prior to serving in Congress, we form a buy-minus-sell portfolio tracking the performance of the common stock transactions that new members made in the years they were running for elections. The results in Table 2 
Portfolio Performance Through Time
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we investigate how the portfolios of new members We call these members consistent traders. According to Table 1 , the consistent traders were elected to the 109 th and the 110 th Congress since only then they could have trading data for two consecutive terms based on our sample period.
We first create a pre-congressional portfolio to measure the extent of informed trading by the consistent traders prior to their congressional service. Next, we create two post-election portfolios based on our sample period: We present the empirical results in Tables 3, 4 and 5. There is not any evidence of informed trading in the transactions that the consistent traders placed during their election period. Table 4 indicates that the lack of positive abnormal returns persist in the first term.
However, the abnormal returns in Table 5 
Power as Source of Information
Karadas (2015) shows that common stock transactions by the powerful members of Congress contain much more value-relevant information than those by the non-powerful members. The improvement in the abnormal returns from the first term to the second term may be also caused by serving on a powerful committee. We use congressional committee assignments to identify the powerful members. The committee assignment data come from Stewart III and Woon (2011) . We rely on the committee rankings by Stewart III and Woon (2011) , who uses the approach developed in Groseclose and Stewart III (1998) to rank committees post-1994. We designate the top 10 influential committees in each chamber as powerful.
These committees include Ways & Means and Appropriations in the House, and Finance and
Armed Services in the Senate. The full list for each chamber can be found in Stewart III and Woon (2011) . Some members transition to powerful committees during a given congressional term. Therefore, the same member's trades can show up in both powerful and non-powerful samples depending on his or her committee assignments in the same congressional term.
We separately analyze the portfolio performance of the powerful and non-powerful mem-bers in their first and second terms. In the First Congress portfolio, there are 10 powerful members with 522 transactions, and 12 non-powerful members with 2,474 transactions. In the Second Congress portfolio, there are 13 powerful members with 3,128 transactions, and 6 non-powerful members with 2,344 transactions. Table 6 shows the portfolio performance of the first-term members of Congress. There is no evidence of informed trading for the non-powerful members of Congress. However, there is poor portfolio performance indicated by significantly negative alphas for the powerful firstterm members at the 1-week holding period. We have a completely opposite picture when we look at the results in Table 7 . For the second-term, the portfolios of powerful members earn statistically significant abnormal returns consistently at the 3 and 12-month holding periods.
The results in Tables 6 and 7 present a very interesting picture on the role of power in access to information. The non-powerful members' portfolios show lack of informed trading in both their first and second terms. However, the change in the information content of trades by the powerful members from the first term to the second term is drastic and warrants careful explanation. The results suggests that non-powerful members lack access to valuerelevant information, and thus their portfolios do not earn abnormal returns. On the other hand, the benefits from being on a powerful committee do not emerge until the second term.
It is possible that first-term powerful members try to trade based on information, but they may lack either the experience to interpret information or may lack quality information to make informed decisions as they are new in their positions. By the time they are in the second term, it is likely that they have more experience and access to better information.
An additional possibility is that membership on an influential committee does not confer an informational advantage, but rather the power to influence policy in a manner that generates abnormal returns. The difference between the first and second term seems to be more consistent with the power channel rather than the information channel. There is also the possibility that the poor performance of the powerful members in the first term may be driven by the small sample (only 522 transactions). Politicians might just find it difficult to free up the time to trade given the demands of joining Congress and an influential committee.
Overall, however, our results from the committee-based analysis reveals that membership on an influential committee is associated with abnormal returns for relatively new members of Congress.
Conclusion
In this paper we present evidence that members of Congress have no or very weak informational advantage in trading stocks prior to joining Congress. Further, we find that the informational advantage found in previous work does not appear immediately following election. Consistent with previous work, we find that there are significantly positive abnormal returns from serving in Congress but it takes two consecutive terms of service and powerful committee membership to obtain them. Overall, this paper sheds light on how serving in Congress leads to abnormal returns.
Our results, unfortunately, cannot distinguish between the information benefits of membership on an influential committee or the power associated with said committee. Our finding that membership on powerful committees does not lead to abnormal returns in the first year of service but does in the second is suggestive of the power mechanism, but further research needs to be done to distinguish between these two mechanisms. Thus while our results highlight the financial benefits of joining Congress and serving on an influential committee, we are not able to explain why members on powerful committees are able to earn abnormal returns. We obtain the transactions data from Center for Responsive Politics, the stock returns data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and excess market returns, size, book-to-market, and liquidity factors from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). In constructing the portfolio returns for each member of Congress, each transaction is either weighted equally or by transaction size. In constructing the overall (i.e., average) portfolio returns, member-level portfolios are weighted equally. We follow these procedures in constructing an overall buy and an overall sell portfolio, and focus on the returns on the buy-minus-sell portfolio. We hold this buy-minus-sell portfolio for 1/4, 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12 months periods. As a result, our sample period ranges from 2004M01 to 2011M12. We measure the risk-adjusted returns via Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama-French 3-Factor Model (FF), Carhart 4-Factor Model, and 5-Factor Model based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors using 3 lags, and report the associated t-statistics in parenthesis. We denote the 10, 5, and 1 % significance levels with *, **, ***, respectively.
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